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Abstract—As a popular application, mobile crowd sensing
systems aim at providing more convenient service via the swarm
intelligence. With the popularity of sensor-embedded smart
phones and intelligent wearable devices, mobile crowd sensing is
becoming an efficient way to obtain various types of sensing data
from individuals, which will make people’s life more convenient.
However, mobile crowd sensing systems today are facing a
critical challenge, namely the privacy leakage of the sensitive
information and valuable data, which can raise grave concerns
among the participants. To address this issue, we propose an
enhanced secure certificateless privacy-preserving verifiable data
authentication scheme for mobile crowd sensing, named EPDA.
The proposed scheme provides unconditional anonymous data
authentication service for mobile crowd sensing, by deploying
an improved certificateless ring signature as the cryptogram
essential, in which the big sensing data should be signed by one
of legitimate members in a specific group and could be verified
without exposing the actual identity of the participant. The
formal security proof demonstrates that EPDA is secure against
existential forgery under adaptive chosen message and identity
attacks in random oracle model. Finally, extensive simulations are
conducted. The results show that the proposed EPDA efficiently
decreases computational cost and time consumption in the sensing
data authentication process.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the big data era, a mass of mobile terminals (such as
smart phones, tablets and laptops) equipped with a variety of
sensors (e.g., GPS, accelerator, camera) are producing huge
amount of sensing data. It changes the traditional crowd
sensing mode to Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) [1], [2], [3] as
illustrated in Fig. 1, where the sensing tasks could be released
more quickly and conveniently, and the sensing data could be
collected promptly. At present, MCS systems have been widely
used in vehicular networks (for the location information and
traffic data), body area networks (for physical bio-information)
[4], [5], Internet of things (for the real-time condition), social
networks and so on [6], [7]. This trend has accelerated the
progress of smart cities.
Recently, more and more researchers have been studying
the trend and providing a broad prospect of MCS systems, in
which participants submit the sensing data or other requested
information via their intelligent terminals to third parties who
Fig. 1. A simple architecture of MCS systems
are interested in these data for specific purposes. The collected
data may be very sensitive since it is likely to reveal the privacy
of the device owner [8], [9], such as identity, location, health
status, and personal activities. It may lead to many uncertain
security threats and affect the enthusiasm of the participants.
Therefore, users’ privacy-preserving and security issues should
be taken into consideration seriously in MCS systems [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20].
In [21], a typical architecture of MCS system was intro-
duced, which usually includes three participants: a group of
clients, a network management (NM), and a query service
provider (SP). Upon receiving a sensing task, participants
gather and submit the required sensing data to the cloud server
of a SP. Once collecting enough sensing data, the SP forwards
the result to the requester for further analysis. However, if
MCS systems deploy traditional public key cryptography to
authenticate these data, it may raise heavy burdens of the
certificate verification and management. An available approach
is to introduce Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-
PKC), which does not involve complicated certificate manage-
ment any more. In 2003, Al Riyami and Paterson proposed the
first certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) [22]. By
combining the merits of traditional key management system
(PKC) and identity-based cryptography (IDC) [23], CL-PKC
is used to implement the implicit certification (through users’
IDs) to address the inherent key escrow problem in IDC
(through the user’s secret information). CL-PKC has been
attracting more and more attentions in recent years [24], [25],
[26], [27], [28], [29], [30].
Ring signature is a kind of effective cryptogram essential
[31] to protect users’ privacy, which was first introduced
in 2001. Any member in a specific group can generate a
signature anonymously on behalf of the group, and anyone
else including the other members in the group can verify
this signature. Since no information about the signer’s ac-
tual identity is revealed, the verifier cannot determine which
member generated the signature. However, designing a ring
signature scheme based on certificateless cryptography is not
trivial. In 2007, Chow et al. proposed the first certificateless
ring signature (CL-RS) [32]. After this original work, many
certificateless ring signatures [33], [34], [35] were published
subsequently.
In this paper, by deploying an improved CL-RS, we pro-
posed an enhanced certificateless privacy-preserving data au-
thentication scheme for MCS systems. The proposed scheme is
proved to be secure from existential forgery on adaptive chosen
message and identity attacks in random oracle model, assum-
ing that the k-Collision Attack Algorithm (k-CAA) problem
and the Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman (Inv-CDH)
problem are intractable. Finally, the performance is evaluated.
The simulation results show that the proposed EPDA is more
efficient for the privacy-preserving MCS scenario.
The rest part of this paper is organized as follows. The
preliminaries are introduced in section II. In Section III, the
enhanced privacy-preserving data authentication scheme for
MCS system is presented in detail, including the security
analysis. In Section IV, the performance of EPDA is evaluated.
Finally, the conclusion is given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To facilitate the understanding of the cryptogram essential
in EPDA, we introduce the basic definitions and the properties
of bilinear pairings over elliptic curve group. Also, we give
the security model for EPDA. For easier illustration, Table I
lists some important notations which will be further explained
where they occur for the first time.
A. Bilinear Pairings
The bilinear pairings of algebraic curves are defined as a
mapping: G1 ×G1 → G2 where (G1,+) is a cyclic additive
group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and (G2, ·)
is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. Bilinear
pairings have the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(aU, bV ) = e(U, V )ab, ∀ U, V ∈ G1 and
a, b ∈ Z∗q . This can be related as ∀ U, V,W ∈ G1,
e(U + V,W ) = e(U,W ) · e(V,W ) and e(U, V +W ) =
e(U, V ) · e(U,W );
• Non-degenerate: There exists U, V ∈ G1 such that
e(U, V ) 6= g, where g denotes the identity element of
G2;
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(U, V ) for all U, V ∈ G1.
To prove the security of EPDA, we assume the following
hard problems in G1:
Definition 1. k-Collision Attack Algorithm Problem (k-
CAAP): Given a fixed and known integer k, a (2k + 2)-tuple
(t1, . . . , tk, P,Q = sP,
1
t1+s
P, . . . , 1
tk+s
P ) ∈ Zkq × G
k+2
1 ,
output a pair (A, c) such that A = 1
c+sP .
Definition 2. Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem (Inv-CDHP): Given P and aP for a ∈ Z∗q , output
1
a
P .
B. Security Model
We assume there are two types of opponents with different
capabilities in EPDA:
1) AI is an attacker who is able to replace public keys, ex-
tract partial private keys and make sign queries without
the master secret key.
2) AII is an attacker who can obtain the master secret key.
It may replace the public keys, extract partial private
keys and make sign queries.
We will prove the security properties of EPDA in the
existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message and
identity attacks (EUF-CL-RS-CMIA2) model [32] for both
two types of adversaries. Also, we will give the analysis
on anonymity. An opponent could reveal the real identity of
any signer with the probability no more than 1/n, while the
member in the group is with the probability no more than
1/(n− 1). Here, n is the number of the group.
III. ENHANCING PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA
AUTHENTICATION FOR MOBILE CROWD SENSING
To meet the unconditional privacy-preserving demands in
some certain MCS scenarios, we propose an enhanced privacy-
preserving data authentication scheme for MCS system, which
can preserve the anonymity of participants, by deploying
an improved certificateless ring signature as the cryptogram
essential.
A. Design Objectives
With different kinds of micro-sensors for location, tem-
perature, and biomedical being integrated into the intelligent
terminals, it has been possible for a mass of users to sense and
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
q a large prime number h(·) secure hash function h(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
G1 a cyclic additive group of order q P a generator of G1
G2 a cyclic multiplicative group of order q g a generator of G2
A1,2 two types of adversaries data sensing data
C a challenger σ digital signature
Ppub network manager’s public key s network manager’s private key
RIDi the public key of the user with IDi SIDi the private key of the user with IDi
R the public key set of participants L the identity set of participants
upload sensing data to the MCS cloud upon different requests.
For instance, an institution of public health service may intend
to gather participants’ bio-information, like heart rates, blood
pressure and so on at different times to study the changing
trend of these factors in a day to reveal the relationship of each
other. Moreover, the transportation management bureau may
make use of the sensing data for monitoring and managing the
urban traffic situation. Crowd sensing data collected by various
intelligent terminals bring a various of convenient services for
the querying clients or institutions, as the ubiquitous access of
the Internet enables nearly real-time feedback. It saves lots
of time and cost for the sensing data requester. However,
no matter how promising the MCS is, it will not be well
accepted only when the principle privacy issue is resolved
perfectly. For example, a user’s sensing data might involve
private information like identity, location, and so on. Leaking
out these private information to the cloud servers or other
users could cause critical privacy disclosure or even physical
attacks [14], [15], [18], [19], [20]. Therefore, the participants
might not be willing to accept the sensing tasks on account of
privacy issues.
To begin with, we assume there is a TTP (Trusted Third
Party) in the MCS system defined as NM which can generate
and certify cryptographic keys. All participants should interact
with NM in advance for key distribution. In addition, the MCS
is operating over insecure networks. Therefore, anonymity
is a basic property and the existence of active rivals who
attempt to subvert the real identities of MCS clients can not be
ignored. Based on the above assumptions and considering the
characteristic of the mobile crowd sensing system. We design
an authentication scheme with the following properties:
• Achieving anonymous sensing data authentication regard-
less of particular MCS scenarios over insecure channels.
• Operating with relatively low computational cost.
B. Design Architecture
There will be three types of entities: MCS clients, the
Network Manager (NM), and the Query Service Provider
(SP) in the framework of EPDA, as shown in Fig. 2. In
general, MCS clients refer to the participants in different
regions equipped with smart phones to collect and submit
various sensing data. SPs could be cloud servers of health
organizations or research institutions. Additionally, NM is in
charge of generating the partial private key for each user
and publish identity indexes based on clients’ public keys,
which are used to authenticate all sensing data. In EPDA,
NM is modeled as a trusted but curious third party. Note that
the partial private key generated by NM is not sufficient to
impersonate a legitimate client.
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Fig. 2. The framework of EPDA for MCS
C. The Enhanced Privacy-Preserving Data Authentication
Scheme
In general, the NM generates the system parameters firstly.
Then, the NM generates the public keys and partial private
keys for clients based on their identities in the register stage.
Meanwhile, each client in MCS system calculates his/her
partial private key based on a secure random number. The
MCS participants use the private key for signing the sens-
ing data, and SPs use a list of public keys for verifying
respectively. When a client submits the signed sensing data
to an SP, the SP will verify if the received sensing data is
from a legitimate participant by checking the signature. If
the verification equation holds, the uploaded data is valid. In
EPDA, we will utilize an improved variant of CL-RS, which
can ensure that though SPs can verify the signed sensing
data in authentication procedure, they are not able to recover
the actual identity of any participant. Supposing that SPs and
clients are time synchronization, our protocol can be illustrated
as follows:
1. Initialization. In the first place, given security system
parameter l, NM generates keys for all participants in
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Fig. 3. The registration of EPDA
EPDA and initializes the authentication procedure. Let
(G1,+) and (G2, ·) denote two cyclic groups of prime
order q > 2l and e : G1×G1 → G2 be a pairing operator
that satisfies the properties of bilinear and nondegenerate.
Let L = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn} denote the set of iden-
tities of n clients and R = {RID1 , RID2 , · · · , RIDn}
be the set of corresponding public keys. The NM de-
termines its public or private key pair 〈Ppub, s〉, where
Ppub = sP , and publicizes the system parameters
〈l, G1, G2, q, P, e, h, QNM 〉.
2. Registration. To accomplish MCS tasks distributed by
any SP, a client need register to the NM. The whole
registration steps shown in Fig. 3 should be performed
in turn:
a. The client sends his/her IDi to the NM firstly.
b. Upon receiving IDi, the NM calculates DIDi =
1
s+qIDi
P , where qIDi = h(IDi), and sends DIDi
back to the client.
c. The client chooses a random xIDi ∈ Z
∗
q , and
computes SIDi =
xIDi
qIDi
DIDi , RIDi =
1
xIDi
(Ppub +
qIDiP ) and INDIDi = qIDiRIDi . Then s/he sends
RID to the NM.
d. The NM calculates INDIDi = qIDiRIDi and adds
a record of 〈IDi, RIDi , INDIDi〉 to the database.
Then, the NM sends 〈IDi, INDIDi〉 to the SP. The
SP maintains two lists: L = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn}
and I = {INDID1 , INDID2 , · · · , INDIDn}.
3. Uploading. Upon receiving a sensing task from the
SP, each participant gathers and uploads the required
sensing data. Firstly, s/he chooses vIDi , r ∈ Z
∗
q ran-
domly, and then computes VIDi = vIDiP , i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}\{aˆ}, u = grΠi6=aˆe(VIDi , INDIDi) =
gre(P,
∑
i6=aˆ vIDiINDIDi), h = h(data, t, u, L, I) and
VIDaˆ = (h + r)SIDaˆ , where t is the system time
to keep the freshness of the messages. Eventually, the
participant outputs the signature on sensing data as σ =
{u,
⋃n
i=1{VIDi}} and uploads it to the corresponding
query service provider.
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Fig. 4. The flowchart of data authentication
4. Verify. As shown in Fig. 4, the SP first checks the
system time t, and then verifies the signature σ =
{u,
⋃n
i=1{VIDi}} on the submitted sensing data, by
checking if gh(data,t,u,L,I) ·u =
∏n
i=1 e(VIDi , INDIDi)
holds. If it does, the SP accepts the data. Otherwise, the
SP discards this submission.
D. Security Analysis
In this section, we give the security proof in EUF-CL-RS-
CMIA2 model.
Theorem 1. The proposed EPDA is existential unforgeable
against both AI and AII adversaries in the random oracle
model under intractability assumptions of k-CCAP and Inv-
CDHP respectively.
Proof. The security of the data authentication protocol relies
on the intractability of k-CCAP and inv-CDHP. It can be
deduced similarly as the security proof in [32]. Due to the
page limitation, we omit the proof in detail.
Theorem 2. The proposed EPDA is unconditionally anony-
mous.
Proof. Although VIDi is randomly selected in G1, there is
always a r′ satisfying (h + r′)SIDi = VIDi for each client
i (i ∈ {1, · · ·, n} \ {aˆ}), which is similar to (h + r)SIDaˆ =
VIDaˆ . It is impossible for any adversary to reveal the identity
of a client from VIDi , thus we can ensure anonymity of the
participants in MCS system.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
1) Computational comparison with other schemes: We now
compare our scheme with other similar schemes in [32],
[34], [35]. We mainly consider the time-consuming operations
including the bilinear pairing operation (BP), scalar multipli-
cation in G1 (SM), exponentiation in G2 (EXP) and hash
operation (Hash), n is the number of clients. The number of
these operations in the selected schemes are shown in Table
II.
In the signing stage, the proposed EPDA requires only one
BP operation that is the most complex operation, while the
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN EXISTING SCHEMES
Sign VerifyAlgorithm
BP SM EXP Hash BP SM EXP Hash
CY[32] 1 3n-2 1 n+1 n n 1 1
ZZW[34] 2 2n+3 n n+1 3 2n 0 n+1
Wang[35] 3 3n+3 0 n 3 2n 0 n+1
EPDA 1 2n-1 1 1 n 0 1 1
schemes in [32], [34], [35] need 1, 2 and 3 such opera-
tions respectively. However, in all schemes, the number of
BP operation does not increase with the number of users,
so it has the least effect on the performance in this stage
when the MCS task involves a large number of users. In
contrast to BP operation, the computation on the other three
types of operations will vary with the number of users. In
EPDA, 2n-1 scalar multiplication, 1 exponentiation and 1 Hash
operations are involved, so its time consumption in this stage
is 2n× TSM approximately, while that in [32], [34], [35] are
about 3n×TSM+n×THash, 2n×TSM+n×TEXP+n×THash
and 3n× TSM + n× THash respectively.
In the verification stage, the proposed EPDA requires n
bilinear pairing, 1 exponentiation and 1 Hash operations, but
no scalar multiplication. So its time consumption in this stage
is n × TBP approximately, while the schemes in [32], [34],
[35] require n × TBP + n × TSM , 2n × TSM + n × THash
and 2n× TSM + n× THash respectively. According to above
analysis, EPDA is more efficient with the increasing of the
number of users.
2) Performance evaluation of EPDA: In order to evaluate
and test the performance of the selected schemes, we first
set up a simulation hardware environment to measure the
computation overhead of each scheme. The simulation envi-
ronment is Linux Ubuntu OS over an Intel Pentium G630
2.7 GHz processor and 4096MB memory. The ECC-based
function library is pbc-0.5.14. In order to better evaluate the
system performance, we assume that there are n users that try
to upload their sensing data in a certain time slot. We choose
type A curve to complete the simulation. Type A pairings are
constructed on the curve y2 = x3 + x. The algorithms run
more efficient and faster over type A curve than other types
of curves, especially for the exponentiation computations. So
this kind of curve is often used to implement the elliptic curve
cryptography.
Fig. 5 shows that the time overhead on key generation
among these schemes is very close, while that in EPDA is
least.
We repeat the execution of each scheme for 1000 times,
and draw up the time consumption by calculating the average
value in different stages. Fig. 6 shows the comparison of the
time consumption on signing, verification, and total time con-
sumption between different schemes with the various number
of users, respectively. The scheme in [32] requires much less
execution time than the schemes in [34] and [35], but takes
larger amount of running time than EPDA. As the number
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Fig. 5. Comparison on time consumption of key generation between different
schemes
of users increases, the gap grows rapidly. According to the
simulation results, EPDA has the highest efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we put forward an enhanced privacy-
preserving data authentication scheme for MCS scenario, by
deploying an improved certificateless ring signature as the
cryptographic primitive. The proposed EPDA can be imple-
mented in MCS systems to provide both data authentication
and privacy protection with unconditional anonymous verifi-
cation property. Formal security analysis is also conducted,
which lays theoretic foundation to strengthen the soundness
of EPDA. The performance comparison between our scheme
and the existing schemes shows that the proposed scheme can
achieve both low computation complexity and time efficiency.
It is an effective solution to the challenges of privacy leak
faced by MCS systems.
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